About Aboutness by Nathan Salmon
AbstrAct
A russellian notion of what it is for a proposition 
to be “directly about” something in particular is 
defined. Various strong and weak, and mediate 
and immediate, russellian notions of general 
(direct or indirect) aboutness are then defined 
in terms of russellian direct aboutness. In par-
ticular, a proposition is about something iff the 
proposition is either directly, or strongly indi-
rectly, about that thing. A competing russellian 
account, due to Kaplan, is criticized through a 
distinction between knowledge by description 
and denoting by description. The epistemologi-
cal significance of russellian aboutness is as-
sessed. A russellian substitute for de re propo-
sitional attitude is considered.
Key words: russellian propositions, direct and 
indirect aboutness, knowledge by acquaintance 
and by description, denoting, de re proposition-
al attitudes, Kaplan
1.
According to russell, the propositions 
that Walter scott is scottish and that the 
sole author of Waverley is scottish are 
both about scott, although in different 
ways. The former is about scott by virtue 
of including scott himself, rather than 
a representation, as a constituent. (I as-
sume here that ‘Walter scott’ is, contrary 
to his later views, what russell calls a 
‘genuine name in the strict, logical sense’.) 
The latter, according to russell’s theory of 
descriptions, is just the proposition that 
* I am grateful to the participants in my seminar at 
Ucsb during spring 2006 for acting as the initial 
sounding board for many of the ideas presented here.
 I write ‘the sole author of Waverley’ instead of simply 
‘the author of Waverley’ to indicate the intended mean-
ing. In “On Denoting” (russell 905; russell 2005), 
russell explicitly indicates that his understanding of 
the definite article deviates from a standard usage. He 
concedes that “we do, it is true, speak of ‘the son of so-
and-so’ even when so-and-so has several sons, but it 
would be more correct to say ‘a son of so-and-so’. Thus 
for our purposes we take the as involving uniqueness” 
(russell 905, p. 48). Many readers have disregarded 
russell’s explicit stipulation. He might have empha-
sized the stipulation by writing ‘the only such-and-
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something is both uniquely author of Waverley and scottish. It includes neither scott 
nor a representative as a constituent.
Where p is a proposition and x is either an individual or another proposition, a russel-
lian notion of direct aboutness is definable as follows:
p is directly about x =df  x is a proper constituent of p. 
(stricter notions of direct aboutness are available to russell.) It is assumed that the 
relevant notion of constituent-hood—for present purposes a primitive—is such that 
if x is a constituent of p, then ipso facto x is also a constituent (albeit not ipso facto 
an immediate constituent) of any proposition having p as a proper constituent. since 
the proposition that scott is scottish is immediately directly about scott, the complex 
propositions that it is not the case that scott is scottish, and that either snow is white or 
scott is scottish, are also directly about scott, although only mediately, since both are 
immediately directly about the proposition that scott is scottish. 
russell’s principle of acquaintance is his thesis that the apprehension of a proposition 
requires acquaintance with the proposition and each of its constituents. It follows from 
the principle that apprehension requires acquaintance with each of the things the prop-
osition is directly about.
It is less clear what it is for a proposition to be about something merely indirectly. In 
903 russell explored a notion of indirect aboutness at some length in his posthu-
mously published “On Meaning and Denotation.” He there wrote: 
we may know a proposition about a man, without knowing that it is about him, 
and without even having ever heard of him (russell 903, p. 37)
… when we say “the present Prime Minister of England favours retaliation”, 
we make a statement about the present Prime Minister of England, who is Mr. 
Arthur balfour; and thus, whether we know it or not, we make a statement 
about Mr. balfour. The terms [individuals] a proposition is about are different, 
therefore, from the constituents of the proposition, and the notion of about is 
different from that of constituent. (russell 903, p. 328) 
russell was working here within a Millian framework, which takes proper names to be 
directly designative and which assigns a concept to a definite description as its semantic 
content (“meaning”), leaving it to the concept to fix a designatum for the description. 
by the time he wrote “On Denoting,” russell had a different theory of definite descrip-
tions, according to which the description ‘the sole author of Waverley’ does not desig-
nate (refer to, stand for) anything, and indeed does not have any meaning.2 Neverthe-
2 russell says, “Denoting phrases have no meaning in isolation.” More fully, he says, “This is the principle of the 
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less, in russell’s 905 terminology, a description the only x: φx (see note  above) is 
said (misleadingly) to denote the individual that uniquely satisfies its open sentence (or 
common noun phrase) φx, if there is such an individual, and to denote nothing other-
wise. so-called denotation by a definite description is a pseudo-semantic relation. It is a 
kind of simulation of genuine designation between a genuine name and its bearer. 
Whereas the description ‘the sole author of Waverley’ represents (“denotes”) scott, ac-
cording to russell, the sentence ‘The sole author of Waverley is scottish’ expresses (or 
designates) a proposition that allegedly (unlike the sentence) does not include any sin-
gle component, element, or feature that represents scott. How, then, is the proposition 
genuinely about scott? 
russell’s pseudo-semantic notion of denotation holds the key to a corresponding no-
tion of indirect aboutness between propositions and individuals. He says, “What we 
know about [things not directly perceived] is obtained through denoting. All thinking 
has to start from acquaintance; but it succeeds in thinking about many things with 
which we have no acquaintance” (russell 905, p. 480). Extrapolating from the 905 
theory of descriptions, the following definition captures a significant russellian notion 
of aboutness:
p is immediately weakly indirectly about x =df (∃F)[ (y)(Fy ≡ x = y)  &  p ╞ 
^(∃z)(y)(Fy ≡ y = z)^ ],
where ╞ is logical entailment between propositions. The predicate variable ‘F’ is to be 
interpreted intensionally, i.e., as ranging over “intensions”—properties or concepts or, 
as russell would have it, propositional functions—not over classes or sets or fregean 
“concepts,” i.e., functions to truth-values. ̂  is a mark of indirect quotation. (for russell, 
indirect-quotation marks are superfluous, since sentences are interpreted as designat-
ing propositions.) In short, a proposition p is immediately weakly indirectly about x 
when x is uniquely F, and furthermore, p entails that something or other is uniquely F, 
for some property F.
The proposition that something is both uniquely author of Waverley and scottish is 
immediately weakly indirectly about Walter scott, despite the fact that no proper com-
ponent represents him. I interpret russell’s “On Denoting” as urging some such notion 
of aboutness as this. Indeed, it may be said that the possibility of this sort of aboutness 
without one-on-one representation is precisely the central point of “On Denoting.” 
theory of denoting I wish to advocate: that denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that 
every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning” (russell 905, p. 480). He means that 
determiner (“denoting”) phrases have no semantic content (“meaning”) at all, although the sentences in which 
they occur have a content, expressing a proposition determined partly by the determiner phrase, partly by the rest 
of the sentence.
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What makes the notion of immediate weak indirect aboutness weak is that not only 
the proposition that something is both uniquely author of Waverley and scottish, but 
also anything logically equivalent to it, is immediately weakly indirectly about Walter 
scott. Thus the conjunctive proposition that all authors of Waverley are the same and 
at least one author of Waverley is scottish, despite evidently having a form significantly 
different from the proposition that something is both uniquely author of Waverley and 
scottish, is just as much immediately weakly indirectly about scott. Whereas the prop-
osition that something is both uniquely author of Waverley and scottish is immediately 
weakly indirectly about scott, its denial is not. Neither is the proposition that either 
snow is white or else something is both uniquely author of Waverley and scottish. This 
is not objectionable, since these propositions, although indirectly about scott if the cor-
responding singular propositions are directly about him, are not immediately indirectly 
about him. They are only mediately indirectly about him. 
A potentially undesirable feature of the notion of immediate weak indirect aboutness is 
that an inconsistent proposition is immediately indirectly about each and every thing. 
Thus the conjunctive proposition that something is both uniquely author of Waverley and 
scottish and Waverley was co-authored is as much immediately weakly indirectly about 
shakespeare as scott. fortunately, a variety of more restrictive notions are also available to 
russell. In light of the weakness of our present notion it is good to continue our quest. 
One natural stronger notion of immediate indirect aboutness is the following binary 
relation between propositions p and individuals x:
p is immediately very strongly indirectly about x =df (∃F)[ (y)(Fy ≡ x = y)  &  (∃G)(p 
= ^(∃z)[(y)(Fy ≡ y = z) ) & Gz]^ ) ].
Whereas the proposition that something is both uniquely author of Waverley and scot-
tish bears this relation to scott, the equivalent conjunctive proposition that all authors 
of Waverley are the same while at least one author of Waverley is scottish evidently 
does not. such is the price of this stronger notion of immediate indirect aboutness 
that does not hold between inconsistencies and every individual whatsoever. A more 
problematic feature—and the reason this type of immediate indirect aboutness is very 
strong—is that the proposition that the sole king of England in 830 spoke to the sole 
author of Waverley bears our new relation to one of george IV and scott but not to the 
other. similarly for the converse proposition that the sole author of Waverley spoke to 
the sole king of England in 830. 
I submit something between our two notions of immediate indirect aboutness:
p is immediately strongly indirectly about x =df (∃F)(∃F2)…(∃Fn)(∃i, 0 < i ≤ n) 
[ (y)(Fiy ≡ x = y)  &  (∃Gn)(p = ^(∃z)[(y)(Fy ≡ y = z) & (∃z2)[(y)(F2y ≡ y = z2) & 
… & (∃zn)[(y)(Fny ≡ y = zn) & Gn(z, z2, …, zn)]]…]^ ) ].
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According to russell’s theory of descriptions, the propositions that the sole king of 
England in 830 spoke to the sole author of Waverley and that the sole author of Wa-
verley spoke to the sole king of England in 830 are both immediately strongly indi-
rectly about both george IV and scott. The proposition that all authors of Waverley are 
the same while at least one author of Waverley is scottish is not immediately strongly 
indirectly about scott (or anyone else). Inconsistencies are not immediately strongly 
indirectly about everything.3
2.
The negative proposition that no unique author of Waverley is scottish, although it is 
not immediately strongly indirectly about scott, is arguably directly about the posi-
tive proposition that some unique author of Waverley is scottish, denying of it that it 
obtains. The latter, positive proposition is immediately strongly indirectly about scott. 
similarly, the disjunctive proposition that either snow is white or some unique author 
of Waverley is scottish, although not immediately strongly indirectly about scott, is 
directly about a proposition that is immediately strongly indirectly about him. The dis-
junctive proposition is thus mediately strongly indirectly about scott. This suggests a 
general notion of strong indirect aboutness, whether mediate or immediate:
p is either immediately strongly indirectly about x or directly about a proposition 
immediately strongly indirectly about x. 
russell presumably intends some version or variant of this notion, whereupon a propo-
sition p is about x when p has as a constituent one (or both) of two things: x itself—di-
rect aboutness—or, alternatively, a proposition concerning some property F uniquely 
of x, that something or other is both uniquely F and ...4 
The formulation displayed above likely does not capture the most useful notion of in-
direct aboutness. to see why, consider first the proposition—call it ‘P’—that george IV 
believes that scott is scottish. (Never mind russell’s contention that george IV is unable 
to apprehend, let alone believe, any proposition directly about scott. P’s truth-value is 
not at issue.) P is directly about george IV, and also directly about the singular proposi-
tion that scott is scottish. The latter, in turn, is directly about scott. On the definition 
proposed at the beginning of this essay, P is therefore also directly about scott. Indeed, 
P, in some sense, attributes a particular relation to george IV and scott: the relation, 
3 russell might have had in mind something more restrictive than immediate weak indirect aboutness but less 
restrictive than immediate strong indirect aboutness. I do not know whether he says anything that settles the mat-
ter. The main points I shall make are largely unaffected if a less restrictive notion of immediate indirect aboutness 
is employed in lieu of the conservative notion defined in the text.
4 Any proposition having an inconsistent component, e.g., ~(p & ~p), is indirectly weakly about each and every 
thing. see the previous note.
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x believes y to be scottish. This is in contrast with the proposition—call it ‘Q’—that 
george IV believes that something is both uniquely author of Waverley and scottish. Q 
is directly about george IV and the proposition that something is both uniquely author 
of Waverley and scottish. Q is thus about a proposition that is immediately strongly 
indirectly about scott. but Q is not itself directly about scott.
Is Q then indirectly about scott? We do not inquire here about the proposition that 
something is both uniquely author of Waverley and scottish, which assuredly is indi-
rectly about scott, but about the significantly more complex proposition Q. Is Q about 
scott? It may be impossible to know how russell would have answered this question, but 
it is very plausible that Q is not about scott at all, either directly or indirectly. Whereas 
P attributes the particular relation, x believes y to be scottish, to george IV and scott, 
Q does not do this. Instead Q attributes a different relation, that of believing, to george 
IV and a particular proposition, which, as it happens, is indirectly about scott. While 
the latter proposition—that something is both uniquely author of Waverley and scot-
tish—is intuitively indirectly about scott (since, in light of Waverley’s authorship, it is 
scott and his nationality that make it true), the proposition that george IV believes it 
does not get at scott in the same way—indeed it does not seem to get at scott in any way 
worthy of the epithet ‘about’. If one asserts P, one asserts a relation between george IV 
and scott and, intuitively, what one says is very much about both of them. This asserted 
relationship between King george and scott—that the former believes the latter to be 
scottish—if it obtains, is what makes one’s assertion true. by contrast, if one asserts Q, 
intuitively one thereby says merely that King george believes something, something 
that is true if and only if the property of uniquely having authored Waverley and the 
property of being scottish are co-instantiated. Q concerns not george IV and his cog-
nitive relations to scott, but george IV and his cognitive relation to specific concepts 
(or propositional functions): having authored Waverley, being Scottish, and a variety 
of logical concepts. It is King george’s cognitive relation toward those concepts that 
makes Q true, if it is, or false, if it is. scott himself is all but irrelevant to the issue of Q’s 
truth-value.
The point emerges more clearly from the perspective that russell shared with frege in 
903. According to frege, the occurrences of ‘the sole author of Waverley’ and ‘is scot-
tish’ in the sentence ‘george IV believes that the sole author of Waverley is scottish’ 
have their indirect designata (ungerade Bedeutungen), there designating the phrases’ 
customary English senses rather than their customary designata. The sentence thus 
asserts a cognitive relation not between george IV, scott, and the class of scotsmen (or 
the latter’s characteristic function), but between george IV and the customary senses of 
‘the sole author of Waverley’ and ‘is scottish’. to be sure, if Q is true, then King george 
bears some relation to scott and the class of scotsmen—for example, the relation, x 
believes some proposition or other whose components determine y and z. but the fact 
that if Q is true then King george bears this relation to scott and the class of scotsmen 
obtains only in virtue of the historical fact that scott uniquely authored Waverley. Had 
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someone else done so, Q might still be true, in which case King george would bear this 
relation to Waverley’s author instead of to scott. Q’s truth conditions constitutively con-
cern george’s cognitive relations toward certain senses, not his relations to scott and 
the class of scott’s countrymen. (to forestall irrelevant considerations concerning the 
metaphysical essentiality of the sole authorship of a work of fiction, the example may be 
changed to ‘george IV believes that the man standing before him is scottish’.) 
In 903 russell self-professedly held a view very similar to frege’s. It might be pre-
sumed, therefore, that he would have agreed at that time that Q is not about scott 
even indirectly, but about King george and a certain proposition (which proposition 
irrelevantly happens to be indirectly about scott) and its constituents. russell presum-
ably agreed with frege that King george’s cognitive relations to scott himself have no 
bearing on the truth-value of Q; what matters are King george’s cognitive relations to 
a variety of concepts, including that of the sole author of Waverley. As russell himself 
observed, according to this philosophical point of view, there is “no backward road” 
from scott to his representation as the sole author of Waverley. 
Although russell would come to have a different theory of descriptions by 905, this 
significant shift in theoretical viewpoint provides little reason to suppose that he should 
also have changed his mind concerning the question of what things P and Q are respec-
tively about. On the contrary, his 905 theory of aboutness is aimed at preserving as 
much as possible about aboutness from the fregean perspective while rejecting the fre-
gean theory of descriptions. russell might well have believed even in 905 that while P 
is about scott, Q is about a proposition (which, in turn, is indirectly about scott) and 
its various components, including the propositional function, uniquely having authored 
Waverley, but not about scott.
This creates a difficulty for constructing a general notion of mediate strong indirect 
aboutness. How can we say that the proposition that if snow is white then something 
is both uniquely author of Waverley and scottish is strongly indirectly about scott, 
whereas Q is not? I submit the following:
p is strongly indirectly about x =df p is either immediately strongly indirectly 
about x or has a proposition q immediately strongly indirectly about x as a truth-
functional proper constituent.5
The relevant notion of truth-functional proper constituent is to be understood so that q 
is, but p is not, such a constituent of the complex proposition: either George IV believes 
p or else q. The truth-value of the whole proposition is a function of the truth-values 
of George IV believes p and q, but not of the truth-value of p. The proposition that ei-
5 An analogous notion of weak indirect aboutness results by replacing immediate strong indirect aboutness with 
immediate weak indirect aboutness. The relevant notion of truth-value here is not semantic (the truth-value of a 
sentence), but metaphysical (the truth-value of a proposition).
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ther snow is white or else nothing is both uniquely author of Waverley and scottish is 
strongly indirectly about scott. by contrast, Q is not strongly indirectly about scott. In 
fact, Q is not about scott at all. It is about george IV and the proposition that the sole 
author of Waverley is scottish.
I fear that the notion of strong indirect aboutness defined above might still fail to cap-
ture the intended notion. Even so, I am optimistic that, if not the notion defined here, 
then some variant of it, may be properly introduced to distinguish russell’s intended 
notion of mediate strong indirect aboutness from its immediate cousin.
given an appropriate general notion of strong indirect aboutness, we may finally intro-
duce a general notion of aboutness as follows:
p is about x  =df p is either directly or strongly indirectly about x.6
One has a thought/belief/knowledge about x by thinking/believing/knowing a proposi-
tion about x. In particular, then, one can have a thought about x even though no proper 
component of one’s thought (of the proposition thought) represents x. so it is, in this 
very roundabout way, I believe, that according to russell our thinking – our beliefs, 
our knowledge, our cognition – engages with the external world beyond the severely 
restricted confines of our acquaintance.
3.
David Kaplan disagrees. He argues that russell had in mind a much stricter notion of 
aboutness, one that employs knowledge by description. I quote at length:
russell’s very notion of knowledge by description seems to require an unmentioned 
complication in his analysis. Knowledge by description requires knowledge that 
there is exactly one thing satisfying the description. but a description may be used 
in expressing attitudes other than knowledge, for example, when george IV asked, 
‘Is the author of Waverley present in this room?’ Now this is a query about scott 
in just the way that george IV knowing that the author of Waverley was present in 
the room would be knowledge about scott. russell says that through denoting we 
succeed in thinking about many things, not just knowing about many things. so 
I read russell as claiming that knowledge by description is what enables all forms 
of thinking about. Keep in mind that knowledge of a thing by acquaintance and 
knowledge of a thing by description are russell’s two ways for thought to connect 
with things. There are, for russell, no relevant further ways for thought to connect 
with things. for example, merely suspecting that there is exactly one so-and-so 
6 An analogous notion of weak aboutness results by replacing strong indirect aboutness with weak indirect about-
ness. (cf. the previous note.) Q is not even weakly about scott. Unlike P, Q is not about scott at all.
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does not enable you to think about that thing (even assuming your suspicion 
is correct). Thought connects directly with things through acquaintance and 
indirectly through knowledge by description (knowing that there is exactly [one] 
thing of a certain kind). Mere suspicion won’t hook you up. Once we know that 
there is exactly one so-and-so, we can freely use the description ‘the so-and-so’ to 
express propositions that are about (in russell’s italicized way) the denotation of 
the descriptive phrase. [I think] this is a correct reading of russell … 
… russell speaks of ‘all thinking’ and our succeeding in ‘thinking about many 
things’. He doesn’t limit himself to knowing about many things. so if in my thinking, 
I am wont to query whether the author of Waverley is present at the banquet, the 
standard russellian elimination does not correctly capture what russell tells us 
about my epistemic state. My query involves two propositions, one queried, which 
russell does correctly capture, and another known, which is lost in translation. Note 
that in ‘george IV wished to know whether the author of Waverley was present at 
the banquet’ neither choice of scope captures the fact that the query is about scott, 
and that it involves a bit of knowledge by description. secondary scope misses the 
knowledge, and even the mere fact that there is exactly one author of Waverley, and 
primary scope makes the query ‘by acquaintance’.
… The fact that russell’s analysis does not imply that george IV knew that there 
was exactly one author of Waverley is a criticism of the analysis, and shows that 
the mere elimination of the description from the sentential complement to the 
propositional-attitude verb (when the attitude does not imply knowledge) does 
not correctly capture the epistemic situation as Russell took it to be.
… In summary, for russell, all thinking about requires knowledge, knowledge by 
description. If the use of a definite description is to indicate that we know that 
there is such an individual …, then the mere phrase would signal the presence of 
this form of knowledge, even though the primary explicit propositional attitude 
might be wishes, wonders whether, doubts, etc. In general and in giving examples, 
russell neglects to mention this (Kaplan 2005, pp. 983-985).
Kaplan evidently argues that according to russell’s epistemology (from “On Denoting” 
on), the sentence
() george IV wondered whether the sole author of Waverley was present,
on its intended reading, is correctly analyzed neither by means of the standard russel-
lian primary-occurrence analysis,
() (∃x)[ (y)(y authored Waverley ≡ x = y)  &  george IV wondered-whether (x was 
present) ],
which “makes the query ‘by acquaintance’”, nor by means of the standard secondary-
occurrence analysis,
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(2) george IV wondered-whether [ (∃x)[(y)(y authored Waverley ≡ x = y) & x was pres-
ent] ],
which “misses” King george’s knowledge of scott. Instead, the definite description oc-
curring in () allegedly signals knowledge by description, yielding the following analy-
sis:
(K) george IV knew-that [(∃x)(y)(y authored Waverley ≡ x = y)] & george IV won-
dered-whether [ (∃x)[(y)(y authored Waverley ≡ x = y) & x was present] ].
The first conjunct attributes the indicated knowledge by description; the second is just 
(2).
This objection to the standard russellian secondary-occurrence analysis of () is not 
to be confused with Peter geach’s claim that the correct analysis of (), on its intended 
reading, is given neither by (2) nor by (K) but is rather the following:
(g) george IV assumed that exactly one person authored Waverley, and george IV 
wondered whether he (that same author) was present.
geach’s interpretation, naturally understood, evidently corresponds more closely to the 
primary-occurrence reading of (). Like (), (g) apparently “makes the query ‘by ac-
quaintance’,” and thus is not the intended reading.7 Kaplan’s objection to russell is also 
not to be confused with the common but misplaced objection—which Kaplan rightly 
rejects—that (2) is true only if King george wondered whether exactly one person au-
thored Waverley. The secondary-occurrence analysis does not have this consequence.8 
The objection, rather, is that (2) fails, where (K) succeeds, to capture that the query 
reported in () is about scott, given that scott is uniquely author of Waverley. Kaplan 
is not arguing that the proposition expressed by () is indirectly about scott. (It is not 
about scott in the sense defined above.) He is arguing that, on russell’s view, () attri-
butes to King george a query that () entails is about scott, whereas (2), unlike (K), 
merely attributes to King george the query while leaving open the issue of whether the 
attributed query is about anyone.
7 see geach’s brilliant piece (geach 967, p. 63; 972, p. 5). for present purposes (not geach’s), geach’s pro-
posed analysis of () might be formalized as follows:
george IV assumed-that [(∃x)(y)(y authored Waverley ≡ x = y)] & (∃x)[(y)(y authored Waverley ≡ x = y) & george 
IV wondered-whether (x was present)].
The second conjunct is (). A more accurate analysis would invoke Kaplan’s demonstrative-like ‘dthat’ operator, 
representing ‘he (that same author)’ as ‘dthat[the sole x: x authored Waverley]’. 
Question: Did geach mean his second conjunct to be (2) instead of ()? (If so, then (g) is likely a misformula-
tion.)
8 compare saul Kripke (Kripke 2005, the complete paragraph at p. 023) with Kaplan (Kaplan 2005, p. 985, top 
paragraph). The misplaced objection is explicit in Leonard Linsky, Referring (New York, routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 967, 973), at pp. 7-72. geach has been unfairly depicted as making this same objection. On the contrary, 
geach in “Intentional Identity” is the first to acknowledge that (2) does not have the consequence that george 
IV wondered whether exactly one person authored Waverley. (There are echoes of geach in Kaplan’s discussion. 
Kripke mentions geach but does not cite “Intentional Identity.”)
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several things should be noted in response. first and foremost, just as the original sen-
tence () does not have the consequence that King george wondered whether exactly 
one person authored Waverley, it also does not have the consequence that the king 
knew that exactly one person authored Waverley. The sentence is completely neutral 
concerning whether King george knew, believed, disbelieved, doubted, or wondered 
whether exactly one person authored Waverley. russell was well aware of this.9 The fact 
is confirmed through consideration of the following discourse-fragment:
george erroneously believes that there is a largest prime number. He believes, in 
fact, that the largest prime is greater than a google.
The second sentence of this mini-discourse cannot be correctly analyzed as
george knows-that [(∃x)(y)(y is a prime number greater than any other ≡ x = y)] 
& george believes-that [ (∃x)[(y)(y is a prime number greater than any other ≡ x 
= y) & x is greater than a google] ].
The left conjunct here is mathematically inconsistent, whereas the discourse is entirely 
consistent with all the facts of mathematics. The second sentence of the discourse-
fragment is more accurately captured by the right conjunct alone, precisely as russell 
would propose.
One needs to distinguish what a sentence literally expresses from extraneous but re-
lated facts. As a matter of historical fact, King george knew (and assumed) that exactly 
one person authored Waverley—indeed he strongly suspected it was scott—but () says 
nothing of that. Kaplan’s proposed analysis (K) is a proper russellian analysis of the 
secondary-occurrence reading of the following more complex sentence:
(2) george IV, knowing the sole author of Waverley by that very description, won-
dered whether the sole author of Waverley was present.
This sentence is essentially richer in content than (); it captures a further historical 
fact. This observation does nothing to discredit (2) as an analysis of (), on its intended 
reading. On the contrary it discredits (K), which is equivalent to (2) on its intended 
reading. russell was fully aware of all this.
9 Perhaps the sentence is not neutral concerning whether King george assumed that exactly one person authored 
Waverley. see note 7 above. If the frege-strawson theory of definite descriptions is correct, (), on its intended 
reading, arguably has the consequence that george IV presupposed that exactly one person authored Waverley. 
This lends considerable support to an analysis of (), on its intended reading, with elements of both (g) and (K):
george IV presupposed-that [(∃x)(y)(y authored Waverley ≡ x = y)] & george IV wondered-whether [ (∃x)[(y)(y 
authored Waverley ≡ x = y) & x was present] ].
Kaplan remarks about (K), as his proposal for russell’s intended analysis of (), that “the russellian variation on 
the presuppositional analysis is to move it from the semantic to the epistemic” (Kaplan 2005, p. 984).
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In interpreting russell it is crucial that a sharp distinction be drawn between knowl-
edge by description and denotation by description. The former is, and the latter is not, a 
properly epistemic notion. The latter is a semantic notion, or rather it is pseudo-seman-
tic. Denotation by description is pseudo-designation. A definite description, although 
meaningless according to russell’s theory, denotes, according to russell’s misleading 
terminology, the object that uniquely answers to it if anything does. A speaker can 
easily denote something by description without knowing the denotation by descrip-
tion, simply through an appropriate use of a proper description that the speaker does 
not know to be proper. russellian aboutness is not tied to knowledge. rather, it is the 
propositional analog for russell of denotation. A proposition that includes no compo-
nent that represents scott can nevertheless be about scott, indirectly, precisely when 
the proposition is expressible by a sentence that invokes a description that denotes him, 
e.g., ‘The sole author of Waverley is scottish’. The proposition in question is also ex-
pressible, in fact more perspicuously, by sentences that invoke overtly quantificational 
locutions in lieu of a definite description.
Kaplan argues that (K) succeeds, while (2) fails, to capture the fact about the query 
reported in () that it is about scott, given that scott is the sole author of Waverley. I 
find no supporting evidence for Kaplan’s interpretation in the passages Kaplan cites, or 
elsewhere in russell’s writings. (I should confess, however, that I am unable to read as 
fast as russell wrote.) As already noted, () does not entail that george IV knew that 
exactly one person authored Waverley. Does () entail, or otherwise capture, that the 
reported query is about scott, given that scott is the sole author of Waverley, despite not 
capturing that King george knew the sole author of Waverley by that very description? 
I contend that it does, on russell’s understanding of what it is for a proposition to be 
about an individual. The proposition that something was both uniquely author of Wa-
verley and present has the right form to make it immediately indirectly about the author 
of Waverley. since scott uniquely authored Waverley, () attributes to King george a 
query that (whether he knows it or not) is immediately indirectly about scott—accord-
ing to the definition of immediate indirect aboutness proposed above. so does (2). 
Kaplan observes that King george’s query “is a query about scott in just the way that 
george IV knowing that the author of Waverley was present in the room would be 
knowledge about scott.” This observation is correct. but the way that King george 
knowing that the sole author of Waverley was present is knowledge about scott is not 
that King George knows that exactly one person authored Waverley, and that person was 
scott; it is simply that scott uniquely authored Waverley. Kaplan provides no convinc-
ing evidence that, as he puts it, 
knowledge of a thing by acquaintance and knowledge of a thing by description 
are russell’s two ways for thought to connect with things. There are, for russell, 
no relevant further ways for thought to connect with things. for example, merely 
suspecting that there is exactly one so-and-so does not enable you to think 
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about that thing (even assuming your suspicion is correct). Thought connects 
directly with things through acquaintance and indirectly through knowledge by 
description (knowing that there is exactly [one] thing of a certain kind). Mere 
suspicion won’t hook you up. (Kaplan 2005, pp. 983-984)
On the contrary, mere suspicion will hook you up, in the sense that your suspicion is 
for russell about something. but even suspicion is not required. Mere thinking is suf-
ficient, provided one’s thought has the form something is both uniquely such-and-such 
and thus-and-so (or at least entails that there is exactly one such-and-such), or even has 
a proposition of this sort as a truth-functional proper constituent (as with the thought 
that either snow is white or no unique author of Waverley is scottish). One can think 
about scott or Mr. balfour without realizing that one is thinking about him, indeed 
without realizing that one’s thought is even about anyone at all.
4.
Although russellian aboutness is not a specifically epistemic notion, it is epistemo-
logically significant. Without some relation of indirect aboutness, russell’s theory of 
descriptions in combination with his principle of acquaintance forces a radical discon-
nect between thought and the world, leading to a kind of skepticism that russell is 
seeking to avoid in “On Denoting” and more explicitly in “Knowledge by Acquaintance 
and Knowledge by Description.” Indirect aboutness, promiscuous though it may be, is 
epistemologically important because it is through it, according to russell, that we reach 
beyond our cognitive limitations to the things we know merely by description. Indirect 
aboutness for russell is our portal to the world; it is the mind’s access to the reality that 
lies beyond us.
Let qx be a proposition directly about x. We may say that a proposition p generalizes qx 
with respect to x when 
(∃F)[ (y)(Fy ≡ x = y)  &  p = ^(∃z)[(y)(Fy ≡ y = z) & qz]^ ],
where for any individual z, qz is the same proposition as qx except for having occur-
rences of z wherever qx has occurrences of x. A proposition that is strongly indirectly 
about x generalizes—and thereby mimics—a singular proposition directly about x (or 
is trivially equivalent to such a proposition). The generalizing proposition is true iff 
the singular proposition is, both in virtue of how x stands (although this relationship 
between a generalizing proposition and the singular proposition it generalizes typically 
obtains only contingently). 
According to russell, we simulate thinking directly about x by generalizing, and there-
by thinking indirectly about x. We complete the illusion by using denoting definite 
descriptions—grammatically on a par with genuine (logically proper) names—then 
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abbreviating those denoting descriptions by means of pseudo-names (which we call 
simply “names”), syntactically indistinguishable from genuine names. Where we can-
not name (refer, designate), there we denote (in russell’s sense circa 905 and after). 
The result is an elaborate linguistic hoax. Although it is in some sense an illusion of our 
own device, we ourselves are taken in by it. Through denoting we have erected a façade, 
which the philosopher alone can uncover and expose. Our thought is “about” things in 
the world all right, but it is largely merely indirectly about them while we elaborately 
fake thinking directly about them. 
This is russell’s theory of denoting: Denotation by description is the linguistic illu-
sion of designation; as a consequence, nearly all the things our thoughts are about are 
thought about only indirectly, not even by one-on-one representation.
5.
Although Kaplan’s stricter notion of russellian indirect aboutness, by means of knowl-
edge by description, plays no role in russell’s (nor in the correct) analysis of (), it 
might have a central role in filling a significant lacuna in russell’s philosophy of lan-
guage concerning idioms of de re propositional attitude, typically of the form:
α Vs of [about] β that [whether] φ(it/he/she),
where V is a verb of propositional attitude (e.g., ‘believes’) and the pronoun ‘it’ (‘he’ or 
‘she’) is anaphoric upon the singular term β.
It is now widely recognized that Quine’s distinction between the notional and relational 
readings of a sentence in which an existential phrase or indefinite description occurs 
after an attitude verb, as with
(3) ralph believes that someone is a spy,
is but a special case of the more general medieval distinction of de dicto and de re, as 
well as russell’s even more general distinction of scope:
(3) (∃one x)( ralph believes-that [x is a spy] ) 
(32) ralph believes-that [ (∃one x)(x is a spy) ].
Quine explains, “The difference is vast; indeed, if ralph is like most of us, (32) is true 
and (3) false” (p. 84). Most of us believe there are spies, but few suspect anyone in 
particular. Quine goes on to argue that (3) is semantically incoherent, hence meaning-
less. russell knew better. Quine should have. His own explanation of the vast difference 
between (3) and (32) demonstrates that both are coherent and meaningful.0
0 Cf. salmon 995; reprinted in salmon 2007a.
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for russell, the difference is vaster than that. The truth of (3) requires for russell that 
ralph be acquainted with the person under suspicion. As russell matured, ralph’s ac-
quaintances dwindled. Eventually russell came to hold that ralph was acquainted with 
no one but himself. The truth of (3) then required ralph to believe that he himself was 
a spy. Primary-occurrence (or de re or “relational”) locutions had broken away almost 
entirely from their intuitive meaning, the meaning on which ralph could easily come 
to suspect someone—someone else—of being a spy. (still later, russell came to hold 
that ralph was not even someone with whom ralph could be acquainted.)
Is there a way for russell to capture the intuitive idea of there being someone ralph 
believes to be a spy without reverting to his less mature (but far more sensible) theory 
of everyday acquaintance? russell’s theory of descriptions is capable of accommodating 
looser, user-friendlier notions of acquaintance—perhaps a notion according to which 
some, if not indeed all, readers of this essay are acquainted with its author—in addition 
to russell’s notion of strict acquaintance. I am sanguine about the versatility of russell’s 
theory and its potential for dealing with this problem.
One place to begin—although it is only a starting place—is by generalizing, as defined 
above:
(∃F)[ (y)(Fy ≡ β = y)  &  α Vs-that ( (∃x)[(y)(Fy ≡ x = y) & φ(x)] ) ].
This yields a latitudinarian, or promiscuous, notion. One possible instance is the prop-
erty (or propositional function), being a spy shorter than any other, where β designates 
the shortest spy and φ is ‘is a spy’. The difference between this notion and the intuitive 
idea of the de re is vast. We all believe that the shortest spy is a spy, but intuitively, few 
if any among us believe of the shortest spy that he or she is a spy.
A more discriminating notion invokes russell’s knowledge by acquaintance:
(3r) (∃F)( ralph knows-that [(∃x)(y)(Fy ≡ x = y)] & ralph believes-that [ (∃x)[(y)(Fy ≡ 
x = y) & x is a spy] ] ).
This attributes to ralph (in a sense) a pair of de dicto propositional attitudes: a piece 
of knowledge and a belief. It should not be thought of as analysis of (3), let alone as a 
reduction of de re belief to de dicto. taken as an analysis, it would fail to capture the va-
lidity of the inference from (3), on its de re reading, together with ‘Kevin believes every-
thing ralph believes’, to ‘Kevin believes someone is a spy’, on its de re reading. rather, 
(3r) is to be thought of as a weaker replacement for the de re reading of (3), the latter 
being correctly given by the primary-occurrence analysis, (3). In English, (3r) is best 
represented not as ‘There is someone whom ralph believes is a spy’ but perhaps as:
ralph knows someone by a description under which ralph believes that the 
person in question is a spy.
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In the general case, we have the following russellian notion 
α knows β by a description under which α Vs that φ(the individual in 
question), 
which might be invoked in lieu of the stricter notion of primary occurrence. Its analysis 
is:
(∃F)[ (y)(Fy ≡ β = y)  &  α knows-that [(∃x)(y)(Fy ≡ x = y)]  &  α Vs-that 
((∃x)[(y)(Fy ≡ x = y) & φ(x)]) ].
Kaplan’s proposed analysis (K) yields an instance of this—where the value of ‘F’ is the 
property of having authored Waverley, and where α is ‘george IV’, β is ‘Walter scott’, 
Vs-that is ‘wonders whether’, and φ is ‘is present’. In English, King george knew scott 
by a description (to wit, ‘the sole author of Waverley’) under which george wondered 
whether the individual in question was present. It may be intuitive that in wondering 
whether the sole author of Waverley was present, george IV wondered about scott, de 
re, whether he was present.
The principal shortcoming of this russellian substitute for the de re is that it is still 
latitudinarian. ralph’s belief that some spy or other is uniquely shorter than any other 
is not merely a hunch but presumably knowledge, based on the knowledge that there 
are spies and known statistical generalizations concerning the unlikelihood of two in-
dividuals sharing exactly the same height (and the extreme unlikelihood of the two 
shortest spies being genetically identical twins). Hence ralph knows the shortest spy 
by a description under which ralph believes that the individual in question is a spy. 
Yet intuitively—let alone by russell’s more exacting standards—ralph does not believe 
about the shortest spy, de re, that he or she is a spy. 
If russell is to reconstruct the intuitive notion of de re propositional attitude in terms 
he accepts, he will need to invoke some notion stricter than knowledge by description 
yet looser than acquaintance. Perhaps he can borrow one or more notions from the 
reduction of de re to de dicto attempted in Kaplan’s classic essay, “Quantifying In.” 
Kaplan’s notion of a description being a name of its denotation is especially promising 
in this connection.2 Except for the fact that the notion will need to be explained consis-
tently with russell’s contention that the description does not designate its denotation, 
or anything else, since it is altogether meaningless.
 Kaplan 969.
2 Kaplan 969, pp. 225-229. by contrast, Kaplan’s notion of the description in question being vivid seems to me 
especially unpromising. to say that a designator is vivid is to say, among other things, that the designatum (if any) 
is ipso facto highly significant or relevant. I believe Kaplan’s vividness condition is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for the intuitive notion. cf. salmon 2007b; reprinted in salmon 2007a. robin Jeshion has argued, in effect, for 
exactly the opposite view that being a name of is irrelevant whereas vividness is just the ticket. see (Jeshion 2002). 
Jeshion denies that it is a sufficient condition for a belief to be de re that its formulation should invoke a rich and 
detailed description, unless its designatum is ipso facto significant.
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